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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
RELIABLE FURNITURE COMPANY,
A Utah Corporation,

Appellant,
vs.
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation, WESTEiRN GENERAL
AGENCY, a corporation, GENERAL
ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, a corporation,

Respondent.

APPELLANTS BRIEF
NAT·URE OF THE CASE
This is an action for special, general, and punitive
damages and other relief, in which plaintiff claims defendants conspired to compel plaintiff to accept a
lesser amount than was rightfully due under a claim
covered by a "business interruption" fire isurance policy,
issued to plaintiff by defendant American Home Assurance Company, herein called American Home.
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DISPO·SITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted a motion of dismissal
against plaintiff and in favor ~f defendants at pre-trial
hearing, Plaintiff seeks a -reversal.
STATEMENT OF POINT·S
POINT 1. As a matter of law, the trial court erred
in ruling that a tender of $12,609.39 was necessary hefore proceeding to trial.
POINT 2. As a matter of law, the trial court erred
in ruling that money was not property and so to withhold · p·ayment of$84,923.89, admittedly due plaintiff,
was not economic duress and therefore was not actionable.
POINT 3. As a matter of law, the trial court erred
in accepting carte blanche defendants counsel's statement that there was no evidence of economic fraud or
duress even though plaintiffs counsel stated they had
such evidence to pToduce at the trial.
POINT 4.. The trial court erred in ruling that if
$84,923.89 is available for loan purposes anywhere there
could be no economic duress on Plaintiff, because the
mere fact he cannot get that money due to his credit and
financial condition is no sound reason for not obtaining
this loan.
POINT 5. The question of the alleged conspiracy
among the defendants or their authorized agents as it
relates to the issue of economic duress was one of fact
that should have been submitted to a jury, and the
trial court erred in granting the motion of the defendants for a dismissal of the complaint and alleged cause
of action.

2
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POINT 6. The trial court erred in failing to submit
to a jury the issue of the scope of authority of Jack
R. Day in acting for defendant, and in granting motion
for dismissal for the defendants.
POINT 7. The trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss in that the facts before the
court presented triable issues, and therefore, contrary
to the laws of Utah.
STATEMENT OF F ACT:S
On May 12, 1959, American Home issued its standard form fire insurance policy vvith "Business Interruption Form No. 3," insuring plaintiff against loss
directly resulting from necessary interruption of business caused by damage or destruction of insured preises by fire (R. 1, 9, 29; Answer to Request for Admission of Facts No. 6).
On January 1, 19·61, Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. no longer a defendant herein,
issued its policy, insuring plaintiff against loss and
damage to stock, furniture and fixtures, resulting from
fire (R. 1, 20).
On March 30, 1961, a fire occurred at plaintiff's store
in Ogden, Utah causing destruction and damage to
stock, furniture and other property.
During May, 1961, plaintiff submitted a proof of
loss under its policy with Fidelity which was signed by
plaintiff's president, Sam Herscovitz, and subscribed
and sworn to before a notary public in Weber County,
Utah, May 3, 1961 and which listed the amount claimed
under the policy of insurance issued by Fidelity as
$84,923.58 (R. 28; Plaintiff's Answer to Request for
Admission of Facts No. 2).
3
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Under the terms of the insurance policy against
which the proof of loss was submitted by plaintiff,
Fidelity was allowed a period of 60 days after receipt
of the proof of loss within which to investigate and determine whether the payment should be made in the
amount demanded in the proof of loss (R. 28; Plaintiff's
Answer to Request for Admission of Facts No. 3).
On June 19, 1961, payment in the exact amunt asked
in its proof of loss was made to, and accepted by, plaintiff, by draft on Fidelity dated June 16, 1961, which
draft was honored by Fidelity on June 23, 1961 (R. 28291 Plaintiff's Answer to Request for Admission of
Facts No 4).
To effect payment to plaintiff of the amount claimed
in its proof of loss, as described in the preceding paragraph, Fidelity authorized Jack Day and Edward Mabey,
employees of the defendant Western General Agency,
to issue and sign the draft of Fidelity in the amount
of $84,923.58 and authorized Day to deliver the draft
to plaintiff's president, Sam Herscovitz.
Day went to Ogden to deliver the draft to plaintiff
and, with a representative of defendant General Adjustment Bureau, to negotiate a settlement with plaintiff
of its claim against the American Home policy far
business interruption loss. No proof of loss on that claim
had yet been presented (R. 3). Plaintiff concedes it
received full payment from Fidelity but contends it
did so only after Day in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy, withheld delivery of the draft until plaintiff,
under economic duress and coercion, agreed with Day
and Bell to settle its claim against the business interrup4
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tion policy of American Home for about one-fifth the
amount actually due (R. 3, 4, 5). No other claimfor
damages or for other relief was asserted against Fidelity
in the complaint (R. 1-6).
Plaintiff had filed his own sworn proof of loss
for $48,386.00 and mailed it to American Home Insurance Company. Thereafter Western General Agency,
represented by Mr. Day, and General Adjustment Bureau, represented by Mr. Ball went to plaintiff's place
of business and discussed the business interruption loss.
Briefly they wound up a four hour hasel when Mr. Day
stated in final terms that he would deliver the Fidelity's
$84,g.23.58 draft only on Plaintiff's acceptance of
$12,609.39 payment by American Home for business
interruption loss as computed by Mr. Ball soley. In
desperation and with plaintiff's business about to collapse, after 30 successful years, because it had no credit
and no "\vay whatsoever to borrovv $84,923.58, Mr.
Hersco\ritz acceded to this economic duress and pressure and signed the proof of loss.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1. AS A lVIATTER OF LAW, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT A TE,NDER OF
$12,609.39 WAS NECESSARY BEFORE PROCEEDliNG TO TRIAL.
For many years, with some exception, the general
rule has been that it is necessary to return the amount
of value received under contract sought to be rescinded,
or a release given for settlement of some chose in
action, or at least an offer to do so. However, in the
last 15 to 20 years or so it appears the trend is away

5
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fro1n this general rule and there are a great many
states and a great many cases that have held by way
of exception to the general rule that such return, or
tender of return, of the values received need not be
made as a condition precedent to an action for a balance due on the policy, 'vhen the amount received on
the fraudlent settlement is smaller than the amount
to which insured or beneficiary is entitledin any event
under the policy, or where the settlement was void
for want of a valid consideration. Occidental Life
Incurance Company vs. Eiler - 125 Fed. 2nd, 229. "The
amount promised on the face of an insurance policy
must be deemed the liquidated amount of insurer's debt,
when the contingency insured against by the policy's
terms occrus, and the payment of a part of the amount
unquestionably due on such liquidated debt is no "consideration" for release of the balance of the debt.
In the absence of a bona fide controversy existing
between the beneficiary and the insurer, the payment
by insurer of a part of its debt upon a dispute asserted
by .it in bad faith and without any reasonable ground,
.either in law or fact, constitutes no "consideration"
for the release taken by insurer under such circumstances for less than it owes or settlement of the balance,
and a release is void, and the beneficiary suing for the
balance need not tender or pay into court the amount
p~d by insurer, but recovery may be reduced by the
amount of' such payment."
The p-rinciple was applied to double indemnity
insurance, when there was never a dispute as to the
single indemnity, which was paid. It was said that by
6
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paying it the insured obtained nothing to which she was
not entitled, and insurer paid nothing it could rightfully
retain. So that there 'vas no consideration for releasing double indemnity. That theory was also given
effect in American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Reed, 26 Ala.,
App. 350 ( 3), 160 543 (certiorari denied 230 Ala, 221,
160 So. 546); and see Richter v. Richter, 180 Ala. 218,
60 So. 880; Crownover v. Crownover, 216 Ala. 286, 113
So. 42 and also, 175 So. 554 - A1nerican Life Ins. Co.
v. Williams; 17 N.E. 2 851 - Equitable Life Ins. Co.
v. Taylor et al; 75 S.W. 2 77 4 - Kentucky Central Life
and Accident Ins. Co. c Burrs; 187 S.W. 2-56 - Butler
vi Missouri Inc. Co.; 108 S.W. 2 1052 - Schreiber et al
v. Central Mutual Ins. Ass'n; 77 S.W., 2-149 - Yancey
v. Central Mutual Ins. Ass'n; 77 S.W. 2 140 - Sappengton
v. Central Mutual Ins. Ass'n. See also 112 A. L. R. 1215.
But, notwithstanding the many that have made an
exception to the general rule based on the "in any event
rule" when at the pre-trial the trial judge asked counsel
if they were in a position to tender the$12,609.39 to the
defendant American Home, Counsel for the plaintiff
informed the trial judge that they did not have that
much money with them at that time but 0ould get it before the business day was out, and, would then and
there make a tender of such payment. The trial judge
made no further mention of this matter nor suggested
that Plaintiff should or should not make such a tender. ·
POINT 2. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT MONEY WAS
NOT PROPERTY AND SO TO WITHHOLD PAYMENT OF $84,923.89·, AD~IITTEDLY DUE PLAINTIFF, WAS NOT ECONOMIC DURESS AND
•7
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THEREFORE WAS NOT ACTIONABLE.
The pre-trial judge flatly ruled that money was not
property. There was no question that the Fidelity
draft in the amount of $84,923.58 and been made out
and signed by 1\Ir. Mabey and 1\ir. Day, officers of the
defendant \V estern General Agency, on authority of
the company, and authorization given to deliver the
said draft im1nediately to plaintiff. There was no
authority given by it to defendant, Western General
Agency, to withhold delivery unless a proof of loss for
$12,609.39 was signed by plaintiff as full consideration
of its business interruption loss. So that so far. as
all parties were concerned, for all practical purposes,
this draft was the property of the Plaintiff.
A check is "property" within Laws 1923, p. 253, as
to obtaining property by confidence game. Roll v.
People, 243 P. 2d 641, 642, 78 Colo. 589.
A cashier's check is "property," within the meaning of the confidence game statute, when delivered and
put into circ~ation. People v. Miller, 116 N. E .. 131,
138, 278 Ill. 490, L. R. A. 1917 E, 7997.
"Check is Property,"ownership and possession of
which are safeguarded by general laws to same extent
as other classes of property. Central Trust Co. v.
Backsma.n, 198 N. E. 730, 50 Ohio App. 512.
A check, draft, or order which is honored by a bank
when the books of the bank show that the account of
the depositor is thereby overdrawn, or any written
record of such overdraft amounting to primary evidence
thereof, is "property" within the meaning of the Em8
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bezzlement Statute. State v. L.ottridge, 162 Pac. 673, 29
Idaho, 822.
Express cornpany checks, which had not been signed
or countersigned by original payee, but in other respects.
were complete, held "property" subject embezzlement,
being evidence of debt, within West's Ann. Pen. Code,
& 7, subde, 10, 12, and section 484, 503, 510, 514. People
v. Cohen, 235 Pac. 658, 659, 71 Cal. App. 367.

Six blank checks, with stubs attached, each of the
value of one cent, the property of the United States, constituted "property," the subject of larceny, under Rev.
St. & 5456, 18 U. S. C. & 2112, making it a felony to
steal any kind or description of p~roperty belonging to
the United States, 168 F .. 697, 94 C. C. 368.
"Property" is nomen generalissimum, and extends
to every species of valuable right and interest. McAlister v. Pritchard, 230 S. W. 66, 67, 287 Mo. 491.
Generally speaking, the word "property" includes
all property of whatever description whether tangible
or intangible. Bank of F·airfield v. Spokane County,
22 P. 2d 646, 173 Wash. 145.
In its proper sense property includes everything
which goes to make up one's wealth or estate. Carlton
v. Carlton, 72 Me. 115, 116, 39 Am. Rep. 307.
Property signifies every species of property. It is
nomen generalissimum, and comprehends all a man's
worldly possessions. Rossetter v. Simmons, Pa. 6 Serg.
& R. 452.
The term "property" includes everything of value,
9
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tangible or intangible, capable of being the subject
of individual right or ownership. First Nat. Bank of
Estherville v. City Cou~cil of Estherville, 112 N. W.
829, 832, 136 Iowa, 203.
A bank deposit is "property" within statute authorizing proceeding to discover money or other personal
property or the proceeds or the value thereof belonging
to decedent. In re Trevor's Estate, 123 N. Y. S. 2d 527,
529.
Moneys deposited in a bank in a general or ordinary
account became the "property" of. the bank, and a part
of its moneys, funds, and credits, within the meaning
of Rev. St. 9-140, relating to embezzlement of bank's
funds by bank official. State v. Wacker, 243 Pac. 1026,
1028, 120 Kan. 387.
The word "property" may be property used to signify any valuable right of interest protected by law.
Franklin v. Franklin, 155 P. 2d 637, 641, 642, 67 Cal.
App. 717.
"Property" is a generic term, and includes money.
Commonwealth v. Morrison, 9 Ky. (2 A. K. March.) 75,
90.
The word "pToperty has been frequently held to
embrace money and securities. Fry v. Shipley, 29 S. W.
6, 8, 94 Tenn. ( 10 Pickle) 252.
The word "property" embraces money. Fullerton
v. Young, 94 N. Y. S. 511, 512, 46 Misc. 292, citing
Laws 1892, p. 1486, c. 677, & 2-4.
Money is "property" subject to levy by execution.
10
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Exchange Nat. Bank of Montgomery v. S!._ewart, 48
So. 487, 489, 158 Ala. 218.

POINT 3. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE TRIAL
0'0URT ERRED IN ACCELPTING CARTE BLANCHE
DEFENDANTS COUNSEL'S STATE.}.fENT THAT
THERE WAS NO E;VIDEN·CE OF ~CO NOMIC
FRAUD OR DURESS EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFFS
COUNSEL STATED THEY HAD SUCH EVIDENCE
TO PRODUCE AT THE TRIAL.
Defendants counsel made a flat statement that as
far as he was concerned he saw no evidence of economic
fraud or duress in the record and for that reason
thought the court ought to make such a ruling and grant
his motion for a judgment of dismissal on that
basis alone. So far as plaintiff's counsel are concerned,
the court gave the impression that he accepted such
statement as fact and inclined his thinking along those
lines. Certainly if every pre-trial statement of counsel.
as to what could or could not be proven, and, if it were
taken by the judge as a matter of fact, it would app·ear
to us that no case would ever get past the pre-trial
stage. Neither side is expected or obligated to produce
witnesses at a pre-trial. Plaintiff's alleged economic
duress and coersion in its complaint and it would have
to produce evidence and witnesses to substantiate these
allegations at the trial, so that it is reversible error for
the pre-trial judge to accept a statement of counsel
for either party as proven fact. The other party whom
the judge rules against has had no opportunity to
produce evidence to prove the allegations of his complaint. This proposition is so basic and axiomatic
11
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that certainly no law can be found on the subject,
Specifically the sole purpose of the pre-trial is to set
and determine the issues and to learn in advance what
each parey claims he can prove. This was not done in this
case.

POINT 4. THE TRIAL COURT E·RRED IN
RULING THAT IF $84,923.89 IS AVAILABLE FOR
LOAN PURPOSES ANYvv.HERE THERE COULD
BE NO ECONOMIC DURESS ON PLAINTIFF, BECAU·SE THE MERE FACT HE CANNOT GET THAT
MONEY DUE, TO HIS CREDIT AND FINANCIAL
CONDITION IS NO SOUND REASON FOR NOT
OBTAINING THIS ~OAN.
Plaintiff in this case together with his family have
carried on a highly successful furniture business for
over 30 years. However, in late years other furniture
stores have started in Ogden and vicinity. 1Iany Ogden
City residents have gotten in the habit of journeying
to Salt Lake City to do business because of a wider
selection of items. All these things have made the furniture business highly competitive in Ogden, and have
lowered very substantially the extent of credit that
any one firm or individual can expect to receive on the
purchase of merchandise.
$84,923.89 is a very large
sum of money for most any business and is certainly
a staggering sum of money to expect the plaintiff to
be able to borrow. In this fire, plaintiff lost substantially all his merchandise and it "\vas impossible for him
to borrow sufficient money to re-stock and be prepared
to carry on business. Plaintiff had numerous orders
for carpeting which were lost due to the impossibility
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of getting new carpeting to replace the old. Plaintiff
had no collateral or other means of negotiating for a
loan for the large sum of money needed. No company
in the country would send this amount of merchandise to
the plaintiff without a very substantial payment in advance which plaintiff did not have. Even if plaintiff
could have borrowed $85,000.00 the interest payments
would be prohibitive. Plaintiff also had a number of
well-trained employees, 'vho had been with him for a
long time so that in order to assure their continued
services lie kept them on the payroll. Every week that
went by crippled the plaintiff substantially and greatly
undercut chances of re-building and recouping. Had
the plaintiff had any means whatsoever of obtaining
credit or making a loan in the amount of $85,000.00 to
immediately obtain merchandise to continue business
he would have done so, and should have done so, hut
this is not the fact in this case, as plaintiff can prove by
facts, figures, and witnesses that this $84,923.99 was
indispensible to the life of its continued operation. So
we submit that it was reversible error for the pre-trial
j·udge to rule that if $85,000.00 is available for loan
purposes any where in the world that plaintiff had the
obligation to get hold of this money and file suit, and,
if he fails to do so, no matter what the reason there is no
economic duress, we feel this proposition is so elementary that further argument would merely impose upon
the court's good nature.

POINT 5. THE QUESTION OF ALLE;GED
CONSPIRACY AMONG THE DEFENDANTS OR
THEIR AUTHORIZE:D AGENTS AS IT RELATES
TO THE ISSUE OF ECONOMIC DURESS WAS ONE
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OF FACT THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTIDD TO A JURY, AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN GRANTING THE MOTION OF THE DEFENDANTS FOR A DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT
AND ALLEGED CAUSE OF ACTION.
Plaintiff had no funds with which to purchase new
merchandise. Interest on a loan of that size was prohibitive and Plaintiff's merchandise had been depleted
by the Pacific Underwriters Salvage having taken the
merchandise from plaintiff's place of business during
the first week in April, 1961. The result being plaintiff
was unable to offer merchandise to the general public
and clearly points up the duress that the Court referred
to in the case of Whitman Realty and Investment Co.
v. Day, 161 Wash. 72, 296 Pac. 171, 173, wherein the
Court said that duress exists whenever one is induced
by another:
"To make a contract under circumstances 'vhich
deprive him of the exercise of his free will." In the
ease of Riney v. Doll, 116 Kan. 26, 225 Pac. 1059, 1061,
the Supreme Court of Kansas (while finding that no
duress existed said:
"When one uses the bludgeon of duress to break
the will of his adversary and thereby gains a wrongful
or unconscionable advantage, a Court will relieve the
victiln of the consequences of the act he was thus
forced to perform, whether his will be weak, requiring
but one blow to shatter it, or whether it be of ordinary
firmness, requiring several, or whether it be adamant.
requiring many."
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"The Courts now quite generally recognize the
inaccuracy of defining duress by applying it to a person
of ordinary firmness."
As stated in Colton v. Stanford, 82, Cal. 403, 23
Pac. 16, 21, "The question whether there has been an
undue advantage, an unconscionable exercise of superior power, depends largely upon the situation of the
parties at the time of the negotiations."
The California court further stated in Blottman
v. Gadd, 296 Pac., on page 687:
"And intermixed among the elements going to constitute a contract unconscionable are the elements of
fairness, reasonableness, oppression and injustice, each
and all dependent on the facts of each particular case."
Another case in which the Court held that there was
duress is set forth in House v. Carry, 112 V a. 362, 71 S.
E. 551, 70 A. L. R. 711, 712, where a majority stock
holder in control of a company threatened to conduct
its business in such a way as to· render its stock valueless, and refused to deliver any stock to the complainant,
who was under financial stress, unless he would agree
to accept a. smaller percentage of stock than he was
entitled to under his contract, the Court in holding the
agreement invalid as made under compulsion said on
page 712 of 70 A. L. R. :
"The doctrine appears to be well established that,
where one party has possession or control of the property of another, and refuses to surrender it to the control
and use of the owner, except under compliance with an
unlawful demand, a contract made by the owner under
such circumstances, to emancipate the property is to be
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regarded as made under compulsion and duress. Nor
can it be doubted that a contract procured by the
threats inducing fear of the destruction of one's prop-,
erty may be avoided on grounds of duress, there being
nothing in such a case but the form of a contract, wholly
lacking the voluntary assent of the party to be bound
by it. To constitute duress, it is sufficient if the will
be constrained by unlawful presentation of a choice
between comparative evils ; as, inconvenience and loss
by the detention of property, loss of property altogether, or compliance with an unconscionable demand. In
civil cases, the rule as to duress has a broader application at the present day that it formerly had. So
'vhen concessions are exacted through the necessity of
a person, in order to save his property, illegally wit~
held by another, from destruction or irreparable injury,
such a transaction may be voided on the ground of
compulsion though not amounting to technical duress."
In the case of Ingram v. Lewis, 37 A. ( 2d) 259, 70
A. L. R. 710, the Supre1ne Court stated that the defendant Lewis had all of plaintiff's cash that was in his
E.state save and accept for $496.00 and that they, defendant Trustees, could cut off plaintiff's ineo1ne indefina tely by refusing to turn over his proerty or_.--~ign
a. division order. If the evidence adduced is true plaintiff had the choice of signing or starving. Such a release
falls squarely within the two decisions of the Supreme
Court decided in Lonegran v. Buford, set forth hereinafter and Radich v. Hutching, 95 U. S. 210, 213.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah had befor it the question of payments made under duress in
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the case of Buford et al. v. Lonergen, et. al 22 Pac. 164,
wherein judgment was rendered for the plaintiff and
defendant appealed to the S.upreme Court of The United
States in the case of Lonergan et. al. v. Buford, et. al.
148 U. S. 581, 590, 13 S. Ct. 684, 37 L. ed. 569, cited in
70 A. L. R. 710.
"Delivery was refused by defendants until an
illegal and unjust demand for property not delivered
was paid. It was in the midst of winter when the property required the personal care of the owner. Plaintiff's
were compelled to either pay this demand or seek redress by tedious and expensive litigation, the property
remaining meantime in the possession of the parties
hostile to plaintiff's interest, and liable to great deterioration and loss. Payment under such circumstances was not a voluntary payment, and being made under
duress may be recovered back; and the fact that it
was made with knowledge of all the facts makes no.
difference."
The Utah Supreme Court cited from Peyser v.
Mayor, 70 N. Y. 497, wherein Judge Folger speaking
for the Court said on page 167 of 22 Pac.
"I have spoken of coercion in fact and coercion by
law. By the first I mean that duress of person or goods
where present liberty of person or immediate possession
of goods is so needful and desirable as that an action
or proceedings at law to recover them will not at all
answer the pressing purpose."
Also, Stenton v. Jerome, 54 N. Y. 480:
Wheelock Bros. v. Bankers Warehouse Company
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171 p. 2d 405, 1946.
POIN'J~ 6. THE TRIAL COURT ER.R.ED IN FAILING TO SUBMIT TO A JURY THE ISSUE OF THE
SCOPE OF AUTHORITY OF JACK R. DAY IN
ACTING FOR D:IDFE:NDANT, AND IN GRANTING
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL FOR THE DEFENDANTS.
Plaintiff contends Jack R. Day was the general
agent of Fidelity Insurance Company (now out of this
action) and American Home Insurance Company, Fidelity denied a General Agency, American Home never has.
The deposition of Mr. Day strongly indicates a General
Agency for both companies, and we have positive proof
of it but we can only produce it by witnesses. The
question of agency can only be resolved at a trial and
not a pre-trial.
The facts will show what transpired in the Reliable
Furniture Company office on June 19, 1961, between
the hours of 2 :00 p.m. and 6 :30 p.m. as the President of the plaintiff's Corporation great reluctance to
accept the representations as made by general agent,
Jack R. Day.
As to defendant's contention that the Western General Agency by and through its Vice-President, Jack
R. Day, acted outside the authority granted, it must be
noted again that the Restatement of the Law on Agency,
Second Volume, Section 229·, Page 506 set down certain
elements that the Court may use in determining what
authority a general agent has and what acts would
make the principal liable for the general agent's acts
and is set forth as follows: Section 229 KIND OF
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CONDUCT WITHIN SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT:
Restatement of the Law on Agency sets out the
principals' liability in Sections 261, 262, and 265, on
Pages 570, 571, and 575.
Section 261 AGENT'S POSITION ENABLES HIM
TO DECEIVE.
A principal who puts a servant or other agent in
a position which enables the agent, while apparently
acting within his authority, to commit a fraud upon
third persons is subject to liability to such third person
for the fraud. Section 262.
AGENT,ACTS FOR HIS OWN PURPOSES
A person who otherwise would be liable to another
for misrepresentations of one apparently acting for him
is not relieved from liability by the fact that the servant
or other agent acts entirely for his own purposes, unless the other has notice of this.
Section 265
CONDDU~CT

WITHIN APPARENT AUTHORITY OR
EMPLOYMENT GENERAL RULE

A case in support of this position is set forth in
Hartford Life Insurance C-ompany v. Sherman, 233
Ill. 329, 78 N. E. 923 (1906).
A principal or master is liable for exemplary damages for the wrongful, . wanton, and oppressive acts
of his agents or servants when acting within the csope
of his employment although the particular acts were
not authorized or ratified, 134 Pac. 753. Forrester
v. Southern Pac. Company. (Nevada 1913)
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Other cases wherein the Courts have held that the
principal was liable for representations made by its
agent are hereinafter set forth:
Ware v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, 311 P. 2d 316, 181 KAN. 291, 19·57 Case.
Topinka v. American Eagle Fire Insurance Company, 167 Kan. 181, 185, 205 P. 2d 991, 993; Pages 319,
320, of the Ware Case.
Duarte et ux. v. Postal Union Life Insurance Company, 171 P. 2d 574, 584, 1946.
Utilities Engineering Institute v. Criddle, 141 P.
2d 981.
Land Finance Corp. v.. Sherwin Electric Co., 102
Vt.· 73, 146 A. 72; 75, A. L. R. 1025, 1030.
Niartin v. Letham 71 P. 2d 336, 338.
Otis Elevator Company v. The First Nat. Bank,
163 California, 31, 39, 124, Pac. 704, 41 LRA. (N. S.)
529.
Keller v. Safeway Stores, Inc., et al. 108 P. 2d 605,
610, 611.
Grorud v. Lossl 48 Mont. 27 4, 136 Pac. 1069
POINT 7. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S ~lOTION TO DISMISS
IN THAT THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT PRESENTED TRIABLE~ ISSUES, AND THEREFORE,
CONTRARY TO THE LAW OF UTAH.
At no time has the defendants taken issue with
the complaint or amended complaint as failing to state
20
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a cause of action -- they merely deny the allegations.
All depositions and interrogatories are merely contrary
to each other giving rise to triable issues which can only
be resolved by producing witnesses and presenting
documents for the consideration of a jury. A cursory
examination of the file will bear this out.
The pre-trial judge either ignored or overlooked
the law of the State of Utah as laid down by this court
a little over a year ago in the case of Baur v. Pacific
Finance Corp. et al found at 383 P. 2d. 397. In that
case the Court unanimously held and stated as follows:
"As we have heretofore declared, the granting of a motion
to dismiss, which deprives the party of the privileges
of presenting his evidence, is a harsh measure which
courts should grant only when it clearly appears that
taking the view most favorable to the complaint and
any facts which might properly be proved thereunder,
unless it so clearly appears, doubt should be resolved
in favor of allowing him the opportunity to present his
proof."
See also; Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.
2d 344.
Issue was formed on many points of difference
which can only be determined by testimony from both
sides together with documentary proof. The pre-trial
judge evidentally had formed a preconception of what
stipulations had to be made without regard to the plaintiffs intended evidence and theory of the case, for the
minute plaintiff's counsel stated that we could not
answer "yes or no" to a stipulation the court had
formulated but instead tried to explain why a "yes or
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no" answer would alter the course of plaintiff's proposed intended proof, the court summarily granted the
motion to dismiss and refused to consider an explanation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted that the granting of a motion to dismiss made
by defendants at the pre-trial was er~o_neously granted
and should be reversed and remanded to the trial court
for trial.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERTS. SPOONER
PETE N. VLAHOS
414 Eccles Bldg.
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
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